A Concise Guide To Stefan Molyneux's Atheism I am entering the final year of a BA Philosophy at the University of London, this year. To kick things off, I thought I'd do a book review for the blog. The focus this year is the philosophy of religion, and it's been a while since I've done … Continue reading Book Review: “Against The Gods?”, Stefan Molyneux
In On Interpretation, Aristotle presents the thought experiment of the sea battle in order to grapple with a logical paradox stemming from his commitment to correspondence in truth and the Law of Excluded Middle on the one hand, and his commitment to potentiality in the future, on the other. Given these commitments, if we are to say that there will be a sea battle tomorrow, then two questions (at least) need to be considered. First, is it already true that there will be one? Second, is its occurrence already determined by that? The term "already" is an important key to understanding these questions. It suggests a role for necessity in answering this problem. This essay will briefly summarize the logical problem, outline some possible solutions to the problem, and conclude with shrugging resignation at the fact that there isn't more extant writing from Aristotle on the question.
The so-called problem of induction, plainly stated, comes down to this: inductive reasoning appears to have no rational justification. Unlike deductive reasoning, which offers apparent justification in its formal structure, the form of an inductive argument can at best only offer probabilistic confidence, and at worst, no justification at all, if we examine it's application … Continue reading Induction – An Introduction To The Problem
Over the next three posts, I will be outlining the theory of Forms, beginning today with why Plato might have concocted the theory in the first place, moving next to what exactly the theory is and how it works, and finishing up with an analysis of the criticisms of the Forms offered by Parmenides (primarily), and a few others since.
I decided to spend three of my vacation days on the London School of Philosophy's "Summer School" conference, this week. The theme of the conference was "Philosophy: Past, Present, and Future", and the talks focused heavily on the broad questions like the nature of philosophy, it's role and purpose in society, it's place in history, … Continue reading London School of Philosophy – Summer School Conference
Molyneux's book reads like a personal journal that was transcribed directly into print. It is haphazard, overwrought, and at times, stream-of-consciousness. If you're not already familiar with the lingo of internet Libertarianism, you'll be completely confused by numerous passages. If you're not already rehearsed in, and in agreement with, the arguments and positions of right-leaning anarchism ("anarcho-capitalism"), you'll find the presumption of foregone conclusions scattered throughout the book to be irritating at best.
At bottom, the main problem with this book, is that it doesn't appear to have an audience. The dismissive and sneering tone taken toward the political left will put them off. The appeals to the political right will (and has) earned him podcast interviews, but they certainly aren't interested in philosophical inquiry beyond their own prejudices. The academic community has already shunned him as a lightweight at best, crackpot at worst. The book is too polemical and doctrinaire to appeal to the mainstream (many of whom fear him as some sort of cult leader already). So, who is this book for?
So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only...
It has been asked how, if at all, one might resolve the Sorites paradox. I am not convinced a solution is possible, and in this paper I will explain the responses I have become aware of, and why they fail. In the end, I will conclude that there is no solution to the paradox, but … Continue reading The Sorites Paradox – Maybe It’s Not What We Think It is.
Susan Haack nicely diagrammed the problem of circularity in her 1976 paper, The Justification of Deduction. In that diagram, she drew a direct parallel to the circularity of the inductive justification of induction, as outlined originally by Hume. Haack argues that justification must mean syntactic justification, and offers an illustrative example argument to show why … Continue reading Haack and Dummett on The Justification of Deduction
"What is truth?" ~ Pontius Pilate This is an interesting and surprisingly difficult question. If you look in the OED, what you'll find there are entirely circular and self-referential explanations: "the quality or state of being true", " that which is true or in accordance with fact or reality", and "a fact or belief that … Continue reading Getting A Handle On The Truth